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Abstract
This paper presents a simpleNorth-South model of endogenous growth, based on learning
by doing, which is consistent with the following empirical observations: (i) the price of
investment goods relative to consumption goods has been falling for the last 40 years in
most industrialized countries, (ii) poor countries are net importers of investment equip-
ment and (iii) after a period of initial convergence, the sample of open economies exhibits
remarkable stability of the per capita income distribution. In contrast to the research
tradition started by Lucas (1988), in the proposed model, specialization on the techno-
logically stagnant consumption sector does not entail a growth penalty.
Keywords: Endogenous growth, AK model, International Trade, Embodied Technical
Change.
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comments.1 Introduction
Lucas (1988), Stokey (1991) and Young (1991) have started a strand of research which ar-
gues that international trade may cause persistent cross-country di¤erences in per capita real
income growth. This result is derived in a framework where only consumption goods are
traded internationally, there is no physical capital, and countries have identical preferences.
Endogenous growth is due to unintentional sector speci…c learning by doing, the scope for
which di¤ers across sectors. Then, a country driven by static comparative advantage to spe-
cialize on a ‘low-learning’ sector, su¤ers a growth penalty and the global income distribution
features divergence.
Many recent theoretical studies use variants of the above mechanism but di¤er with
respect to the precise reason why some countries specialize on low-growth industries and
others do not. However, they share the prediction that trade liberalization may trap some
countries into a low-growth regime and that those unlucky countries are also likely to be
found in the Southern hemisphere.
The present note argues that in a model with physical and human capital where invest-
ment and consumption goods are tradeable and technological change is embodied, special-
ization on the technologically stagnant consumption sector does not entail a growth penalty:
the lack of own productivity growth is o¤set by a continuous decline in the relative price of
the imported investment good. In contrast to Lucas-type models, this terms of trade trend
improves domestic investment opportunities so that the pattern of specialization is irrelevant
for real income growth and the global income distribution.
The proposed model predicts, in line with the data, that the income distribution within
open countries exhibits remarkable stability. And it builds on two important empirical ob-
servations: …rst, in many industrialized countries the price of investment goods relative to
consumption goods has been falling rapidly over the last decades, highlighting the relevance
of embodied technological change (see Cummins and Violante, 2002, for US evidence). Sec-
ond, poor countries’ are net-importers of investment goods and net-exporters of consumption
good. Figure 1 looks at bilateral trade in goods (excluding energy) between poor countries
and the OECD as a whole in the year 2000. Plotting the share of machinery exports in
total exports on the x-axis and the share of machinery imports on the y-axis, almost all poor
2countries lie far north-west above the 45±¡line1. Thus, their exports to OECD countries
are heavily biased towards consumption goods (de…ned as non-investment goods) while their
imports from OECD countries are mainly made up by investment goods. Moreover, it turns







































































































































































HWWA World Matrix and PWT 6; machinery is SITC7+87+88; N=74; year 2000; 45°-line depicted.
Bilateral trade structure between poor countries and the OECD
Figure 1
To the extent that investment in poor and rich countries does not di¤er too dramatically
in terms of composition, the above observations suggest that poor Southern countries face
a continuous improvement of their terms of trade. Moreover, they appear to be close to
complete specialization on consumption goods.
1The share of machiney exports in GDP is extremely low in outlier countries such as Nigeria (0.21%),
Barbados (0.45%) or Armenia (0.95%). The share is more substantial in China or Indonesia.
2A simple regression exercise over a sample of 97 countries reveals that the di¤erence between a country’s
share of machinery in non-energy imports and its share of machinery in non-energy exports is strongly declining
in the log of per capita income. Doubling per capita income yields a decrease in the measure by over 8
percentage points. The estimate is fairly precise (with a t-value of 5.83) and the R
2 of the regression is 0.2306.
3Building on the above facts, this paper presents a simple learning by doing model, iso-
morphic to Rebelo’s (1991) two-sector AK model, and closely related to Boucekkine et al.
(2003) who study embodied technical change in a closed economy. Within this framework,
trade between a capital-rich North and a capital-poor South is analyzed. Despite South’s
specialization on the stagnant consumption sector, equilibrium growth rates are identical
across countries, while per capita income inequality persists. In the present model, trade
liberalization does not change the long-run growth rate of output in the North, while the
long-run growth e¤ect in the South is ambiguous. Finally, during the adjustment period to
the new balanced growth path, the South grows faster than the North, but the catching-up
process dampens o¤ before real income levels are equalized.
Figure 2 is similar to a picture in Acemoglu and Ventura (2002), but splits the time
horizon into two sub-periods. It examines the evolution of the distribution in real per capita
income within the sample of open economies. We de…ne as open an economy that the Sachs
and Warner’s (1997) index classi…es as open for at least 10 years within the period 1960 to
19803; this is the case for 28 countries4. The data on income comes from the Penn World
Tables (line rgdpch). The …gure overlays two scatter plots: one where the x-axis depicts
a country’s income relative to the median in 1960 and the y-axis shows the same measure
in 1980, and a second where the x-axis looks at the same measure in 1980 and the y-axis
examines the year 2000. The …rst scatter plot is characterized by a cloud of black circles, the
other by a cloud of grey squares.
The …gure also shows regression lines …tted to the scatter plots. For the period 1960
to 1980 the regression lny1980=median(lny1980) = ® + ¯ [lny1960=median(lny1960)] was run,
using OLS and correcting the standard errors for heteroskedasticity. It yields a coe¢cient
^ ¯ = 0:8074 with a t-value of 13:89 and an R2 statistic of 84.25: An F-test on ¯ = 1 was run
and the Null was rejected at the 1% level (F(1; 26) = 10:97). For the period 1980 to 2000
a similar regression was run. Now ^ ¯ = 1:0281 with a t-value of 9:23 and the R2 statistic
3We use the dataset provided in Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2003). Those authors updated the original
Sachs-Warner index and corrected some mistakes.
4The countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France,
Greece, Hong Kong, China, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, Mauritius, Netherlands, Norway,
Peru, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United, Kingdom, United States. Out of this sample
of 28 countries, in 1975 19 were OECD members.
4shows a value of 0.8550: The F-test (F (1;26) = 0:06) cannot reject that ¯ = 1: The slope ¯
indicates whether there was convergence (¯ < 1), stability (¯ = 1) or divergence (¯ > 1) over
the period in question. Thus, we are led to conclude that the period 1960-1980 looks as if
there was convergence in real per capital incomes between open economies, while the period



























































































































































































































































































































































Data Source: Penn World Tables 6.
Change in income distribution of open countries; 1960-1980; 1980-2000
Figure 2
The main reference of the paper is Lucas (1988) and the following endogenous growth
literature that examines the e¤ects on learning by doing and international specialization
on the cross-country distribution of income. The proposed model is close to Acemoglu &
Ventura (2002), who also study the implications of terms of trade movements on countries’
incentives to accumulate capital. It is, however, di¤erent to their model, in that it brings the
empirically relevant case of trade in investment goods together with well documented evidence
on embodied technical change. The model is also close to dynamic two-country, two-sector,
two-factor Heckscher-Ohlin models, see for example Chen (1992) or Ventura (1997) and the
references therein. However, these papers consider diversi…ed economies only and do not
discuss the implications of embodied technical change in a free-trade environment.
5The remainder of this paper comes in four sections: section 2 brie‡y reviews the Lucas
mechanism, section 3 introduces the model and proofs the main proposition of the model,
section 5 provides some discussion of the results and section 4 concludes.
2 The Lucas mechanism
Since the present paper makes major reference to Lucas (1988) (section V), a brief overview
of his model seems valuable. In his model, there are two technologies, which are used to
produce two distinct consumption goods. Technologies are linear in labor and there is no
physical capital. It is easiest to understand his setting by alluding to a two country case, but
generalizations are easily possible. In both countries, consumers have identical preferences




s;t with N i
1;t + N i
2;t = 1: (1)
where countries are indicated by a superscript i 2 f1;2g. The …rst subscript s 2 f1;2g refers
to the sector, and the second, t > 0; to time. Sectoral output quantities are given by yi
s;t;
the share of labor allocated to sector s is N i
s;t and the total labor force in each country is
normalized to unity. Sectoral productivity depends on unintentional learning by doing and
is given by the amount of sector speci…c human capital given by hi
s;0e±st: While the initial
stock hi
s;0 di¤ers across countries, the rate of learning, ±s; is the same.
In autarky, each country produces both goods; in a trade equilibrium, the linearity of the
sectoral production functions implies that countries will completely specialize on one good.
This equilibrium is determinate, if h1
s;0 6= h2
s;0: In the remainder, we assume that h1
1;0 > h2
1;0;
so that country 1 specializes on good 1 and country 2 on good 2. Lucas assumes that the
specialization pattern does not revert.
In each country, there is a representative consumer with identical CES preferences, char-
acterized by an elasticity of substitution ¹ ¾ > 1: Homotheticity implies that consumers hold
nominal expenditure shares constant. Then, as the worldwide supply of good 1 grows faster





6A country specializing on good 1 (country 1) sees its nominal income (in units of the
numeraire, good 2) increase at rate ±1 ¡ ±1¡±2
¹ ¾ , while nominal income in the country spe-
cializing on good 2 (country 2) is ±2: Denoting the expenditure share of good 1 by µ; the





: Hence, real income in country 1 grows at rate










in country 2. Comparing
these growth rates, it follows that g1 > g2. Hence, the country specializing on the stagnating
sector 2 grows at a smaller rate than the other country.
Note that country 2 does bene…t from technical progress in country 1 since its terms of
trade are permanently improving. However, this trend is irrelevant for country’s productive
capacity and for the rate at which human capital is accumulated.
3 A learning by doing model with embodied technical change
3.1 Setup
The model features two goods, a consumption good, and an investment good: The consump-
tion good is produced from capital and labor according to a Cobb-Douglas function and can
be either consumed or used as an input in the production of investment equipment. We
normalize the labor force to unity and write kt for the total capital stock. cs
t and is
t stand for
supply of consumption and investment goods, respectively. Input into the investment sector
is written xt: The parameter 0 < ® < 1 describes the output elasticity of capital, and z > 0
and at > 0 denote the states of know-how in the consumption and the investment sector. As





t + xt and i
s
t = atxt: (2)
By assumption, there is no technical progress in the consumption sector, whence z is a
constant. In contrast, know-how in the investment goods sector increases with accumulated




t where A > 0 if x¿ > 0 for all ¿ < t and A = 0 otherwise. (3)
Thus, technical progress is embodied in new investment goods and investment sector spe-
ci…c knowledge A depreciates totally and immediately if production of investment goods is
stopped. This is probably the simplest way to represent the idea that knowledge is at least
partly sector speci…c. Weaker assumptions are easily possible at the cost of complication: all
we really require is that sector speci…c knowledge depreciates fast enough when xt = 0; so
that the specialization pattern following trade liberalization is irreversible. In autarky, A > 0
for all t; see Lucas (1988).
Technology in (2) is equivalent to Cobb-Douglas technologies in both sectors with the
same output elasticity ® but di¤erent total factor productivities: unity in the consumption
sector and at in the investment sector. Imposing the knife edge condition ®+° = 1; we have
ct = (kc
t)
® and it = A(kt ¡ kc
t); (4)
where kc
t denotes the capital stockallocated to the consumption sector. Thus, our learning-by-
doing framework with embodied technical change is isomorphic to Rebelo’s (1991) two-sector
AK model.
Whether the externality ° is internalized or not, matters only for the size of equilibrium
growth rates but is irrelevant for the international comparison of growth rates. Therefore,
for simplicity, we work with the central planner version of the model, but assume that the
central planner neglects the e¤ect of her decisions on the international price ratio and the
dynamic implications of static comparative advantage.
3.2 Autarky
Under Autarky, domestic supplies and demands coincide. Using tildes to denote these au-



















~ kt = (A ¡ ±)~ kt ¡ A~ k
c
t; ~ k0 > 0: (5)
As usual, ¾ > 0 denotes the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ½ > 0 is
the subjective time discount rate, and ± > 0 is the depreciation rate. A dot over a variable
denotes a time derivative. From now on, we assume that
ASSUMPTION 2
A ¡ ± > ½ > ®(1 ¡ ¾)(A ¡ ±) (6)
holds. This double condition delivers positive equilibrium growth rates and makes sure that
the optimization problem is well-behaved.
Writing gx for the proportional growth rate of variable x; optimal consumption growth








¡(A¡±)t~ kt = 0 (8)
The term ~ ¼t can be recognized as the proportional rate of change of the price of investment






= A~ qt from where it follows that ~ ¼t = ¡(1 ¡ ®) ~ gkc < 0. This negative trend
in the relative price of investment goods entails capital losses which increase the user cost
of capital and therefore slow down the rate of growth of consumption. As shown by Rebelo
(1991), the model does not exhibit transitional dynamics and the sectoral capital allocation
is stationary from t = 0 on, so that ~ gkc = ~ gk. Using the fact that ~ gc = ®~ gk = ®~ gi we can
write ~ ¼t = ¡(1 ¡ ®)~ gc=® and solve (7) for ~ gc:
~ gc =
®
1 ¡ ®(1 ¡ ¾)
(A ¡ ± ¡ ½): (9)
Felbermayr and Licandro (2003) provide more details and discussion. In particular, under
autarky, capital-rich countries feature a lower level of ~ qt than capital-poor countries.
93.3 Trade
At t = 0 countries switch unexpectedly from a state of perfect autarky to a situation where
goods prices are determined internationally. At that point in time, North and South dif-
fer only with respect to their capital stocks and, possibly, investment sector e¢ciency A.
Otherwise they are identical. While goods market are integrated, there is no international
capital mobility. Thus, cross ownerships of capital stocks is ruled out, but part (or all) of
the installed capital stock may have been produced abroad5. In the remainder, …rst we study
the situation in a generic country and distinguish North and South by superscripts N and
S only when we proceed to cross-country comparison. Moreover, international equilibrium
magnitudes are identi…ed by an asterisk.
In the integrated equilibrium the sectoral allocation of capital does not determine the
equilibrium demand for consumption or investment goods. The planner therefore has two
control variables: kc
t and ct where the …rst determines the sectoral allocation of capital and
the second regulates the time path of the state variable, kt. In making her choices, we
assume that the planner takes the time path of the relative price of investment goods relative
to consumption goods as given. This is an important assumption, since the planner could
use commercial policy to in‡uence domestic welfare and enter in a strategic game with the
planner in the other country. For the sake of simplicity this kind of strategic behavior is not
modelled. Note, however, that for the purpose of our main proposition, we need not assume
that goods prices are completely equalized across countries. The result goes through as long
as proportional changes in qt are the same across countries, i.e. if the relative law of one
price holds. Thus, our analysis is compatible with arbitrary trade costs (including optimal
tari¤s) as long as they are multiplicative (such as iceberg transportation costs or tari¤s) and






t: Thus, the main result of the paper is consistent with the fact established by
Restuccia and Urrutia (2001), who show that qS
t is still much higher than qN
t :
5Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) document for 1997 that more than 80% of the world stock of foreign capital
is invested in countries whose per capita income is above 60% of the US level.
6In the remaining analysis, we assume that trade costs are of the iceberg type. This avoids complications
arising from tari¤ generated income.
10We also assume that the planner does not internalize the implications of assumption (3),
by which complete specialization is irreversible. This assumption avoids the technicalities
associated with the discrete loss of investment sector speci…c expertise that specialization on
the consumption goods sector entails. As long as AN ¸ AS it is inconsequential, because the
planner would not be able to implement a better allocation if he took the loss of expertise
into account. Moreover, the assumption is in line with Lucas (1988), where the long-run
implications of irreversible specialization are not internalized neither.
In the trade equilibrium, domestic demands no longer need to equal domestic supplies.
We label domestic demand for consumption and investment goods by ct and it, while output
supplies are given by (kc
t)
® and A(kt ¡ kc
t), respectively. Trade is balanced, so that the value




® for all t: For the ease of presentation, it proofs convenient to split
the planner problem into a static part determining the sectoral capital allocation kc
t; and a
dynamic part which sets ct. 7
The optimal capital allocation maximizes the country’s GDP. Thus, we de…ne the GDP
function (a maximum value function)











At the time of trade liberalization (t = 0); if the planner chooses to close down the investment
sector, i.e. kc
0 = k0; assumption (3) entails that investment sector speci…c know-how A falls
to zero and remains nil. Hence, for all t ¸ 0; we have kc
t = kt: Hence, depending on k0 and
q0, the pattern of sectoral capital allocation obeys








t = kt for all t ¸ 0; (11a)
If k0 > ~ k (q0) =) k
c






< kt for all t ¸ 0: (11b)
7It is of course possible to nest the static and the dynamic problem into one single planner problem. This
yields exactly the same …rst order conditions, but dealing with the possible corner solution in the capital
allocation of the South becomes more cumbersome.
11We are free to choose initial conditions kS
0 and kN
0 to make sure that the equilibrium level
of q¤
0 satis…es kS
0 · ~ k (q¤
0) <
¡¹ k0 ¡ kS
0
¢
: Under this condition, the global endowment of capital
is distributed over South and North such that South lies outside the diversi…cation cone and
completely specializes on the consumption sector. We will see below, that such a situation
may be an equilibrium outcome.
The dynamic part of the planner’s problem consists in choosing the optimal demand









¡½tdt s.t. ct + qtit = y (qt;kt) and _ kt = i ¡ ±kt;k0 > 0: (12)
The optimal growth rate of consumption and the transversality condition associated with









0(R¿¡±)d¿tkt = 0; (14)
where Rt ´ (@y=@kt)=qt is the rental price of capital.
Using condition (11) and distinguishing between North and South by superscripts N and























¡ ½ ¡ ± + ¼t
¸
; (15b)




goods price arbitrage may be hindered by the existence of (constant) ad valorem tari¤s, sub-
sidies and / or multiplicative trade costs. In contrast to the autarky situation, the rental rate
of the South depends on the state variable, since, gS
c;t now exhibits transitional dynamics.
Because these dynamics have repercussions on the time path of ¼t; there will also be tran-
sitional dynamics in gS
c;t .During the adjustment period, the specialized South experiences
faster growth than the diversi…ed North and ¼t falls faster than along the balanced growth
path.
12Before moving to the main proposition of the paper, it is necessary to show that a market
clearing relative price does indeed exist. De…ning the average rate of change of the relative
price of investment goods between times 0 and t as ¹ ¼t = 1
t
R t
0 ¼zdz, we have qt = q0e¹ ¼tt: In
order to identify the equilibrium level of q¤
t , we need to …nd the consumption functions in
each country. Those can be recovered from the Euler equation (13) and the law of motion of
capital. For simpler notation, we may de…ne an interest rate as rt = Rt¡± +¼t and consider
the average interest rate between times 0 and t : ¹ r (t) = 1
t
R t
0 rzdz: Writing wt for the wage
rate, integrating the law of motion of the capital stock and using the transversality condition









This is just the usual requirement, that the present value of consumption equals wealth,
de…ned as the sum of initial assets, q0k0 plus the present value of wage income.
Integrating the Euler equation (13) between 0 and t yields
ct = c0e
1
¾ (¹ rt¡½)t: (17)















where the inverted square bracket denotes the propensity to consume out of wealth. Since ¹ rt is
a function of ¹ ¼t; for any t > 0 an international market clearing condition for the consumption

























































where Xc (¢) denotes the global excess supply for good c and an asterisk denotes an interna-
tional equilibrium price level or rate of change: The …rst square bracket denotes global supply
for the consumption good, while the second square bracket denotes the sum of the national
consumption functions. Note that ¹ gS
k is itself a function of ¹ ¼t: By Walras law, once condition
13(19) is met, the investment goods market also clears.
Clearly, both square brackets are positive, continuous and increasing functions in q0 so
that equation (19) has a solution q¤
0. The below proposition remains intact if we allow for
deviations from free trade, e.g. in form of iceberg transport costs or other trade costs. In
this case, qN¤
t = q¤
t =¿ < q¤
t < ¿q¤
t = qS¤
t , where ¿ > 1 parametrizes the (symmetric costs) of
shipping goods from North to South and vice-versa.
Focusing on the balanced growth path, we are now ready to state the main proposition
of the paper:
PROPOSITION Along the balanced growth path (BGP), if the ‘relative law of one price’
is valid, and the South specializes on the technologically stagnant consumption sector
(i) cross country growth rates are identical and equal to
gc =
®
1 ¡ ®(1 ¡ ¾)
¡
AN ¡ ± ¡ ½
¢
;gi = gc=®; (20)
(ii) the proportional North-South income gap is non-zero and constant;
(iii) moving from autarky to free trade leaves the long-run growth rate in the diversi…ed
economy unchanged, while the specialized economy’s growth rate may be higher or lower under
free trade.
PROOF (i) Along the BGP, growth rates (including ¼t); the nominal saving rate st, and
the sectoral capital allocation are constant. Moreover, since ct = (1 ¡ s)yt and it = syt=qt;








t AN must hold; thus gN
k = ¡¼N=(1 ¡ ®): From expression (15b) it
follows that along a balanced growth path gS
c can be constant only if gS
k = ¡¼S=(1 ¡ ®):
Thus, if the relative law of one price is valid, ¼N = ¼S = ¼¤; it also must hold that gN
k = gS
k .
Moreover, since gc = gk + ¼¤ it follows that gS
c = gN
c :
The growth rate of consumption is found by substituting ¼¤ = ¡(1 ¡ ®)(gc ¡ ¼¤) =)
¼¤ = ¡(1 ¡ ®)gc=® into (15a).

















t AN: Since qS
t ¸ qN




t : so that
the Southern capital intensity remains always below the Northern one. Hence, in terms











































¡ 1 which is a constant since gN
k = gS
k
¼ = ¡(1 ¡ ®)gS




(iii) As (20) shows, only the diversi…ed economy’s level of A matters for the common growth
rate. If AN < AS and South is so capital-poor that it still specializes on the consumption
sector, ~ gS
c > gc while ~ gN





On the measurement of growth across countries. Penn World Tables provide real
GDP in purchasing power parities. In the above proposition, we have shown consumption
grows at the same rate in North and South. Moreover, gc = gy, where y is in units of the
consumption good. Since there is no change in the cost of living over time (the price of
consumption goods has been chosen as the numeraire), we can directly interpret gy as that
growth rate computed in the Penn World Tables. This is also the measure that underlies our
…gure 2.
Note that in the model, even if trade does not completely eradicate international di¤erences
in the relative price of investment goods, along the balanced growth path the rental rate of
capital is equalized over the two countries. Since both countries share the same isoelastic
preferences of the CRRA family, the saving rate does not depend on the level of income or
wealth. Hence, North and South share the same saving rate. Applying NIPA’s methodology
by which the growth rate of real output is a weighted average of the growth rate of investment
and consumption, with the saving rate serving as weight, we derive identical growth rates
8Wheter qN is used in valuing Northern output, or qS or any other relative price does not matter for this
part of the proof, as long as the relative law of one price holds.
15in both countries. Hence, the result is robust to this change in the de…nition of real GDP
growth.
However, if we compare an index of industrial output across North and South, the model
trivially predicts that this index grows faster in the North than in the South.
No case for protectionism. Part (iii) in the proposition yields a rationale for an infant
industry protectionist policy. If AN < AS, the South grows faster under autarky than the
North, accumulating capital at a greater pace. By assumption, at time 0, the South lies
outside the diversi…cation cone if free trade were to be allowed. However, if trade liberal-
ization is postponed su¢ciently far, the di¤erence between the Southern and the Northern
capital-labor ratio might become so narrow, that the free trade equilibrium no longer entails
specialization of the South. In this case, the factor price equalization theorem would hold,
and both countries would grow at an identical rate because they would face the same accu-
mulation incentives. This common growth rate would be a convex combination of ~ gN
c and
~ gS
c ; so that the North would bene…t and the South would still be harmed. If liberalization is
postponed even further, the South will be so much more capital rich than the North, that it
will be the North that falls outside the diversi…cation cone. Thus, trade liberalization at a
later time might increase the Northern growth rate and lead to higher global growth.
However, this possibility is not sensible, both on theoretical and empirical grounds. The the-
oretical problem is that a narrow focus on growth rates neglects the instantaneous bene…cial
welfare e¤ects of trade liberalization. Given the long time span that it needs for the South
to outgrow the North by so much, that the new equilibrium reverses the specialization pat-
tern, discounting will have made the future possibility of higher growth almost meaningless.
Moreover, recent evidence presented by Hall and Jones (1999) shows that poor countries have
much lower TFP than rich ones, so that the case AN < AS is anyway unrealistic.
We have stressed above, that multiplicative and constant trade costs to not a¤ect the main
result of the paper and that only a relative law of one price is required. Of course, the
irrelevance of trade costs for long-run growth rates does not imply that those costs are irrele-
vant altogether. They constitute distortions which a¤ect the levels of equilibrium quantities,
and keep the gains from trade that the countries reap below the level that obtains under
completely free trade. Note also, that in the above model, any country might want to ma-
16nipulate its terms of trade by means of an optimal tari¤. If both countries chose to do so,
they end up in an inferior situation regarding the static gains from trade. However, dynamic
considerations are again una¤ected, as long as tari¤s do not change over time.
On the relative law of one price. One key assumption in the model is that trade
equalizes the rate of change of the relative price of investment goods. If capital is homogenous,
this is a rather weak requirement. The available evidence shows that poor countries tend
to import and invest used capital goods while rich countries invest into state of the art
equipment. If machinery of more recent vintage is more productive than older machinery,
but otherwise identical, this fact does not constitute any problem an the relative price of old
machinery declines in line with the relative price of frontier equipment.
If, however, capital goods are heterogenous, and di¤erent types of capital are used in di¤erent
sectors, it may well be that the type of capital goods imported by poor countries exhibits a
smaller decline rate of its relative price than those capital goods used in rich countries. This
issue warrants further investigation.
A similar point relates to the wide-spread presumption that poor countries’ terms of trade
have been deteriorating over the last 40 years instead of improving, as in the present paper
(see the extensive literature on the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, e.g. Grilli and Yang, 2000).
This literature is mostly concerned with the price of a basket of commodities (including
minerals, ores, co¤ee, cotton, etc.) relative to the price of manufactured goods exports of
western countries to proxy for poor countries import prices. This measure has indeed declined
considerably over the last 40 years. Note however, that the western export prices used in this
literature do not account for quality improvements and the arrival of new goods. Thus, they
will overstate price in‡ation. Using the price index of US exports computed in the US NIPA
tables, which accounts for the quality bias, a di¤erent picture emerges, and the computed
time series looks much more stationary.9
9The Grilli-Yang index, as used in the literature, is the price of a commodity basket relative to the unit
value of manufactured goods exports from the US. An alternative index would be the price of the same
commodity basket relative to the NIPA price index for US exports. Conducting an augmented Dickey-Fuller
test for unit roots in these time series (1970 to 1999), the Null of a unit root cannot be rejected (at the 1%
level) if the Grilli-Yang index is used while it can be rejected (at the 2% level) if the alternative index is used.
(The underlying DGP involves one lag (chosen with help of the Akaike Information Criterion) and a constant;
results are robust to using di¤erent procedures, such as the Philips-Perron test).
17Extensions. One possible extension to remedy the above criticism would be to allow
for the South to export raw materials. However, it would be very di¢cult to generate an
endogenous long-term terms of trade deterioration for poor countries, because the commodi-
ties discussed in the Prebisch-Singer literature are either products from the mining or the
agricultural sector, in both of which productivity growth seems rather low compared to in-
vestment goods. As long as capital plays a role in these sectors, the above mechanism will
not be a¤ected. It may be that the observed terms of trade deterioration is driven by the
entry of new producers into the market, which is a temporary event and does not constitute
a long-run trend that a growth model should be able to replicate.
Another long-run property of the model may be more problematic but also more straight-
forward to remedy. Along the balanced growth path, the model predicts factor price equal-
ization. In the standard Heckscher-Ohlin framework with capital accumulation, factor prices
would be equalized immediately upon trade liberalization. In that sense, the proposed pa-
per is more realistic. However, factor price equalization de…es the empirically well-supported
Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, by which richer countries have higher price levels. To account
for this fact, it would be desirable to include a non-tradeable consumption good, whose pro-
duction requires labor as an input. The richer the country, the stronger will demand for this
non-traded good be. It is unlikely that this extension changes the core result of the present
paper.
5 Concluding Remarks
Many recent theoretical and empirical studies allude to the basic mechanism of Lucas (1988),
by which international trade can lead to uneven growth as static comparative advantage
leads countries to specialize on industries with di¤erent scope for productivity increases. The
present paper shows that this result depends crucially on the omission of trade in investment
goods and capital accumulation.
We show that countries specializing on the technologically stagnant consumption sector
face a continuous decline in the relative price of investment goods, which constitutes itself an
engine of growth. If the relative law of one price holds, long-run growth rates of output are
equalized across countries. Moreover, in line with evidence, proportional di¤erences in per
18capita income levels persist over time and remain constant. Finally, while trade liberalization
does not a¤ect the long-run growth rate of output in the North, the long-run growth e¤ects
in the South are ambiguous. Interestingly, these results require the law of one price to hold
only in di¤erences, not in levels.
The model is consistent with the following empirical observations: (i) the price of in-
vestment goods relative to consumption goods has been falling for the last 40 years in most
industrialized countries, (ii) poor countries are net importers of investment equipment and
(iii) after a period of initial convergence, the sample of open economies exhibits remarkable
stability of the per capita income distribution.
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